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NOTES 
FAMILY COURTS AS CERTIFYING AGENCIES:  
WHEN FAMILY COURTS CAN CERTIFY U VISA 
APPLICATIONS FOR SURVIVORS OF INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE 
Sylvia Lara Altreuter* 
 
Undocumented intimate partner violence survivors living in the United 
States have limited options for immigration relief.  One of the only avenues 
open to them is the U Visa:  a nonimmigrant visa established by the Battered 
Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000.  To apply for a U Visa, a survivor 
must prove to immigration authorities that she was the victim of a crime; 
suffered substantial abuse; and was, is, or is likely to be helpful in the 
investigation of her abuser.  The statute requires that all U Visa applications 
be certified by an appropriate official who testifies to the applicant’s 
helpfulness with the investigation.  This certification is a tremendous obstacle 
for survivors:  agencies are under no legal obligation to provide these 
certifications, the procedure to obtain them is often complicated and time 
consuming, and the decision-making process is opaque.  Moreover, many 
undocumented survivors fear involvement with the criminal courts or police 
out of fear of their abusers and deportation. 
In response, survivor advocates approach certification creatively and seek 
certification from less obvious authorities.  Undocumented survivors are 
more likely to be involved in family court proceedings—seeking orders of 
protection from, or adjudicating custody and visitation disputes with, their 
abusers—than criminal proceedings.  Advocates have likewise turned to 
family courts to certify U Visa applications.  Family courts are unclear on 
whether they are authorized to certify these applications and are often 
reluctant to make a final decision. 
This Note proposes that family courts are empowered by statutory 
language and history to certify U Visa applications for undocumented 
survivors.  After a textual and legal process analysis of the statutory 
provisions regarding U Visa certification, this Note proposes guidelines for 
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would like to thank my Note advisor, Professor Clare Huntington, for her encouragement and 
her example; and my colleagues on the Fordham Law Review for their thoughtful feedback all 
year.  I would also like to thank Molly Altreuter, Will Newman, and Dr. Audrey Buxbaum, 
for making this possible. 
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practitioners seeking U Visa certification from a family court and for family 
court judges ruling on these applications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the congressional hearing on the Battered Immigrant Women 
Protection Act, one of the bill’s sponsors, Representative Sheila Jackson Lee 
of Texas, told the story of Leticia, one of her constituents.1  Leticia was an 
undocumented Filipino immigrant who sought protection from her abusive 
 
 1. Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999:  Hearing on H.R. 3083 Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Immigration & Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 29 
(2000) [hereinafter BIWPA Hearing] (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee). 
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husband by obtaining a civil order of protection.2  Leticia’s abuser violated 
the order of protection and came to her home, so she called the police.3  When 
the police arrived, instead of going after Leticia’s husband, they asked for her 
green card.4 
The Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000 (BIWPA) was 
enacted to protect women like Leticia.5  BIWPA contains a provision 
establishing a new nonimmigrant visa—the U Visa—which grants temporary 
immigration relief to certain noncitizen survivors of “intimate partner 
violence” (IPV) and victims of similar crimes.6  The BIWPA was 
incorporated in the first reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act 
(“VAWA 1994”),7 a landmark law passed in 1994 to address numerous 
aspects of sexual and intimate partner violence.8 
U Visa applications must be certified by “a Federal, State, or local law 
enforcement official, prosecutor, judge, or other Federal, State, or local 
authority investigating criminal activity.”9  This certification must attest that 
the IPV survivor “‘has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful’ 
in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity.”10  This certification 
requirement presents a significant obstacle for survivors.11 
Regardless of their immigration status, IPV survivors are often reluctant to 
cooperate with law enforcement to put their abusers in prison, typically out 
of fear for their safety, love for their intimate partner, and practical concerns 
about money and housing.12  Historically, law enforcement has not treated 
intimate partner violence as a serious concern, which leads IPV survivors to 
be doubly reluctant to approach law enforcement.13  Compounding the 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
§ 1513(b), 114 Stat. 1464, 1534–35 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012)). 
 7. See id. §§ 1001, 1501. 
 8. See generally Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 
Stat. 1796, 1902–55 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); see also About the 
Office, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ovw/about-office [https://perma.cc/5PM2-
L3VA] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (describing the creation of the Office on Violence Against 
Women pursuant to VAWA, an office which has administered $6 billion in grants to combat 
domestic and sexual violence). 
 9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1) (2012). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Natalie Nanasi, The U Visa’s Failed Promise for Survivors of Domestic Violence 
25–26, 32–37 (SMU Dedman Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 341, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2872866 [https://perma.cc/8PJV-EBK8]; see also Andres Pertierra, 
We All Have a Role to Play in Improving U Visa Process for Immigrant Domestic Violence 
Victims, REWIRE (Sept. 7, 2017, 9:19 AM), https://rewire.news/article/2017/09/07/we-all-
have-a-role-to-play-in-improving-u-visa-process-for-immigrant-domestic-violence-victims 
[https://perma.cc/9R9A-LLM9]. 
 12. See Mount Sinai Sexual Assault & Violence Intervention Program, 2017 SAVI 
Volunteer Advocate Manual & Materials 84–85, 87, 134–36 (2017) [hereinafter SAVI 
Manual] (on file with author). 
 13. See Combating Domestic Violence:  One Size Doesn’t Fit All, NPR (Oct. 21, 2013, 
11:52 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=239129010 
[https://perma.cc/4W6R-YTAG] (“It used to be a time where the police would respond to a 
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problem, undocumented immigrants are even less likely to get involved with 
law enforcement out of fear of deportation and cultural barriers to access, like 
language.14  In a survey of New York State IPV service providers in the first 
year of the Trump administration, 74 percent reported having immigrant 
clients afraid to go to court for fear of encountering immigration 
enforcement, and 48 percent reported having clients afraid of calling the 
police for the same reason.15 
Faced with these fears, advocates often encourage documented and 
undocumented survivors to seek relief in family court.16  Through family 
courts, IPV survivors can, among other things, seek civil orders of protection, 
secure custody of their children, and divorce their abusers.17  Family courts 
allow undocumented survivors to control their own proceedings without the 
involvement of police or a prosecutor.18  Reflecting these practices, 
immigrant advocates have started to turn to family courts to execute law 
enforcement certifications in support of U Visa applications.19  The U.S. 
government has granted U Visas on the basis of these certifications.20 
Some family courts, however, are reluctant to certify U Visa 
applications.21  This Note examines the BIWPA to determine whether family 
courts can continue, or in some cases begin, to certify U Visa applications.  
Clarifying the statutory authority for family courts will allow more 
 
call of domestic violence and they would tell the offender to go take a walk around the 
block.”). 
 14. See SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 25–27. 
 15. ICE in New York State Courts Survey, IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, 
https://www.immdefense.org/ice-courts-survey [https://perma.cc/6Q6A-Q534] (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2018); see also Officials Worry Immigrants Not Reporting Crimes Under Trump, 
WWLP.COM (Apr. 4, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://wwlp.com/2017/04/04/officials-worry-
immigrants-not-reporting-crimes-under-trump/ [https://perma.cc/BQ8E-WV2H] (“In Los 
Angeles, domestic violence reports are down 10% in the Hispanic community.  10%!  Imagine 
somebody being the victim of domestic violence and not calling the police because they’re 
afraid that their family will be torn asunder because of immigration enforcement.”). 
 16. See SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 145. 
 17. See infra Part I.B. 
 18. See SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 145. 
 19. See, e.g., NAT’L IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT, U VISA CERTIFICATION 
TOOL KIT FOR FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL JUDGES, COMMISSIONERS, MAGISTRATES AND 
OTHER JUDICIAL OFFICERS 18–19, 57–68 (2017) [hereinafter NIWAP MEMORANDUM], 
http://library.niwap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/IMM-Tkit-UVisaCertification-
02.03.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNT8-BXB7] (including a template motion for U Visa 
certification); Memorandum from the Advisory Council on Immigration Issues in Family 
Court to Family Court Judges, Chief Clerks & Non-Judicial Staff 2–3 (Feb. 14, 2017) 
[hereinafter NY Advisory Memorandum], http://moderncourts.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/05/342742124-U-Visa-Certification-Guidance-Memo-PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6G 
Q-HCNN]. 
 20. See, e.g., Beth Fertig, Here’s Why Immigrant Victims May (Still) Be Afraid to Report 
Crime, WNYC (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.wnyc.org/story/why-immigrant-victims-may-be-
afraid-report-crime-despite-federal-program-help [https://perma.cc/R59V-9L2B] (describing 
an undocumented IPV survivor, Maria, who was granted a U Visa after her application was 
certified by a family court judge). 
 21. See id.; see also FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, ACHIEVING A CONSISTENT AND LEGALLY 
SOUND U VISA CERTIFICATION IN NEW YORK FAMILY COURTS 4–7 (2016), 
http://moderncourts.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2ModernCourtsU-VisaMemo2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7V66-8MJ2]. 
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undocumented survivors to access the U Visa, escape their abusers, protect 
their families, and access necessary support services and government 
resources. 
Part I of this Note provides background on the relevant social and legal 
issues at stake.  Next, Part II interprets the U Visa statute through textual and 
legal process lenses to determine whether family courts can certify U Visa 
applications.  Part III then surveys how family court certifications are 
currently treated in practice.  Finally, Part IV proposes guidelines for when 
family courts can certify U Visa applications, and it is intended to act as a 
guide for practitioners advocating for undocumented clients. 
I.  THE REALITY OF BEING AN UNDOCUMENTED SURVIVOR 
OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 
Intimate partner violence is a public health crisis in the United States.22  
The latest CDC survey on IPV estimates that over one-third of women and 
almost one-sixth of men in the United States experience abuse from an 
intimate partner in their lifetimes.23  Seventy-two percent of all murder-
suicides committed in the United States are perpetrated by an intimate 
partner.24  Vulnerable populations are especially affected:  transgender and 
gender nonconforming people, people with disabilities, LGBTQ people, and 
the undocumented are particularly vulnerable to intimate partner violence.25 
This Part explores the intersections of immigration, IPV, and family courts.  
Part I.A provides an overview of intimate partner violence as it affects 
undocumented immigrants.  Part I.B describes the importance of family 
courts for undocumented IPV survivors.  Part I.C briefly explains the primary 
avenue of immigration relief available to undocumented IPV survivors:  the 
U Visa. 
A.  Undocumented Immigrants and Intimate Partner Violence 
In hearings on proposed immigration reform before the House of 
Representatives, a social worker from the Shelter for Abused Women in 
Collier County, Florida, shared a drawing and poem by one of her clients, 
Juana.26  When Juana was thirteen years old, she followed a family friend, 
 
 22. See Intimate Partner Violence, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/ 
intimatepartnerviolence/index.html [https://perma.cc/D6SU-LAAK] (last visited Apr. 13, 
2018). 
 23. CDC, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
SURVEY 1 (2012), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/NISVS-StateReport 
Factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HB4-A2W6]. 
 24. Statistics, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://ncadv.org/ 
statistics [https://perma.cc/TF9A-3Y8R] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 25. Press Release, Nat’l Coal. of Anti-Violence Programs, 2015 Report on Intimate 
Partner Violence in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer and HIV-Affected 
Communities in the U.S. Released Today 1–3 (Oct. 18, 2016), http://avp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/2015_NCAVP_IPVReport_MR.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CWN-
9CZH]. 
 26. BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 66, 68. 
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Juan, from Mexico to Florida, to help him care for his three young children.27  
She came to the United States without documentation.28  However, shortly 
after Juana arrived in Florida, Juan began to sexually and physically abuse 
her.29  She had their first child at age fourteen.30  Constantly fearing 
deportation and continuing abuse, even as he threatened to kill her, Juana 
never dialed 911 to seek assistance.31  Translated, Juana’s poem read:  “I feel 
that I am alone / in the world / in the town / in the country.”32 
Intimate partner violence, also known as relationship violence, domestic 
violence, or dating violence, “is a pattern of coercive behavior . . . exerted by 
one intimate partner over another with the goal of establishing and 
maintaining power and control.”33  Abusers assault their partners on every 
front, including physical, sexual, emotional, financial, medical, and 
technological.34  Survivors’ vulnerabilities are also targeted:  for example, 
people with disabilities, who are more likely to have barriers to financial 
stability because of employment discrimination and physical isolation, are 
subjected to a significantly higher level of financial abuse.35  As a training 
manual for IPV counselors explains, “In IPV, perpetrators have on-going 
access to their victims, know their daily routines and vulnerabilities, and can 
continue after violent episodes to exercise considerable physical and 
emotional control over their daily lives.”36 
Noncitizens are particularly vulnerable to IPV.  One survey estimates that 
nearly half of noncitizen women in the United States experience IPV.37  
“Undocumented status gives abusers additional tools of power and control to 
keep victims isolated and intimidated”;38 abusers exploit the immigration 
status of their intimate partners by threatening to report their undocumented 
partners to immigration authorities,39 by isolating them from services that 
 
 27. Id. at 66–67. 
 28. See id. at 66–68. 
 29. Id. at 67. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 68. 
 33. SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 77. 
 34. See What Is Domestic Violence?, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, 
http://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined [https://perma.cc/FW3S-MPLK] (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2018).  
 35. NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, 
TRANSGENDER, QUEER, AND HIV-AFFECTED INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN 2015, at 31 
(2016), http://avp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2015_ncavp_lgbtqipvreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6Z8J-7P4D]. 
 36. SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 77. 
 37. See Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act:  Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 446 (2005) [hereinafter VAWA 2005 Hearing]. 
 38. Ashmar Mandou, Advocates Call for Passage SB 32, LAWNDALE NEWS (Oct. 19, 
2017), http://www.lawndalenews.com/2017/10/advocates-call-for-passage-sb-32/ 
[https://perma.cc/L46Q-KR2W] (quoting a representative of Mujeres Latinas en Acción). 
 39. See, e.g., Shannon Dooling, ‘I Was Afraid of Him and of Immigration’:  Domestic 
Violence Survivors Take Chance Applying for Special Visa, WBUR (Sept. 12, 2017), 
http://www.wbur.org/news/2017/09/12/increase-u-visa-applications [https://perma.cc/PHG5-
QV9D] (quoting an undocumented survivor as saying, “I was afraid of both of them—of him 
2018] U VISAS AND FAMILY COURTS 2931 
would help them acclimate to the United States, and by controlling their 
immigration applications.40 
Often far from their support systems and unable to speak English, 
undocumented survivors are cut off from social services and legal 
assistance.41  Undocumented survivors frequently fear seeking the assistance 
of the police or the courts because of the risk of deportation and 
misunderstandings about their rights.42  In hearings on the 2005 
reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA 2005”), Legal 
Momentum, a nonprofit legal services provider, submitted a compendium of 
stories of noncitizen IPV survivors to Congress, which reflected this fear.43  
These stories demonstrated that while many survivors were reluctant to 
involve police,44 many sought refuge in domestic-violence shelters or with 
other support services,45 and nearly all went to family court to seek orders of 
protection46 or to win custody or support for their children.47 
B.  Family Courts and Undocumented 
Intimate Partner Violence Survivors 
Intimate partner violence is a crime.48  However, IPV survivors are often 
reluctant to involve criminal courts for several reasons.  Survivors often fear 
the retribution of their abusers; and often they still love their abusers—
frequently their spouse, coparent, and someone on whom they are financially 
reliant—and do not want them to be punished.49  Undocumented survivors 
are especially reluctant to approach criminal authorities because they fear 
deportation.  Thus, advocates often suggest family law proceedings for 
undocumented survivors to seek relief from their abusers without risking 
deportation or criminal punishment.50 
 
and of immigration . . . .  [A]ny time I’d confront him, he’d tell me he was calling immigration 
and I was afraid they’d deport me”). 
 40. See SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 25–27; Abuse & Immigrants, NAT’L DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE HOTLINE, http://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-and-immigrants 
[https://perma.cc/9YNA-3KNC] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018); ICE in New York State Courts 
Survey, supra note 15. 
 41. See VAWA 2005 Hearing, supra note 37, at 446; SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 25–
27; cf. Rachel Gonzalez Settlage, Status in a State of Emergency:  U Visas and the Flint Water 
Crisis, 20 HARV. LATINX L. REV. 121, 133–42 (2017) (describing the obstacles for 
undocumented people to access assistance during natural disasters, like language barriers, 
ineligibility for government services, and fear of deportation). 
 42. See LETI VOLPP, WORKING WITH BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN:  A HANDBOOK TO 
MAKE SERVICES ACCESSIBLE 16–17, 28–29 (Leni Marin, ed., 1995). 
 43. See VAWA 2005 Hearing, supra note 37, at 391–416. 
 44. See id.  
 45. See, e.g., id. at 394–95 (Maria); id. at 398 (Madeline); id. at 400 (Mona).  
 46. See, e.g., id. at 393 (Sara); id. at 393–94 (Yesenia); id. at 394–95 (Maria); id. at 397–
98 (Ana). 
 47. See, e.g., id. at 394–95 (Maria); id. at 397–98 (Ana); id. at 400 (Mona). 
 48. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,174 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Senator Patty 
Murray) (“I am very proud to have worked to pass the Violence Against Women Act because, 
for the first time, our Nation recognized domestic violence for what it is—a violent crime and 
a public health threat.”). 
 49. See SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 84–85, 87, 134–36. 
 50. See id. at 145; VOLPP, supra note 42, at 30–34. 
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Family law is almost entirely the province of state courts.51  In medieval 
England, family law was the province of the church, and ecclesiastical courts 
had jurisdiction over “all manners of punishment and determination of pleas 
which touch matrimony or testament . . . and also of all those other things 
which touch the correction of the soul.”52  This meant that all suits concerning 
marriage, divorce, legitimacy of children, establishment of paternity, and 
domestic support were all brought in ecclesiastical courts.53  Today, these 
cases are filed in a state civil court, depending on the structure of the state 
court system. 
Most family law cases are heard in state courts of general jurisdiction.54  
Some jurisdictions assign all family law cases to special divisions within 
those courts.55  In other states, family law cases are heard within a separate, 
general court of equity.56  Beginning in the twentieth century, states began to 
create specialized family courts to hear every kind of family case.57  This 
Note will use the term “family court” to describe any of these situations:  a 
judge in a court of general jurisdiction or chancery adjudicating a family law 
proceeding, a family division judge, or the judge of a family court. 
Intimate partner violence figures prominently in many family law 
proceedings.  Undocumented IPV survivors can divorce their abusers in 
family court,58 which allows them to sever legal and financial ties with their 
 
 51. There is a “domestic relation exception” to federal diversity jurisdiction. Meredith 
Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 140 
(2009).  This exception remains even though the doctrine is in “disarray,” id. at 158–59, and 
marriage and intimate relationships have increasingly been subject to federal litigation, see, 
e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (same-sex marriage); United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (same). 
 52. SELDEN SOC’Y, THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH 74 (Margaret 
McGlynn ed., 2015).  
 53. See R.H. HELMHOLTZ, THE CANON LAW AND ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION FROM 597 
TO THE 1640S, at 523–25, 540, 556–62 (2004) (describing ecclesiastical jurisdiction).  These 
ecclesiastical courts were presided over by clergy and governed by canon law. See id. at 475–
76.  These religious influences are reflected in modern American jurisprudence about family. 
See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (“No union is more profound than marriage, for it 
embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.”); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, 
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”). 
 54. LYNN D. WARDLE & LAWRENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY 
LAW 28 (2002); see, e.g., General Information, KAN. JUD. BRANCH, 
http://www.kscourts.org/kansas-courts/general-information/default.asp [https://perma.cc/GK 
75-7E4P] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (describing how Kansas district courts possess “general 
original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal cases, including divorce and domestic 
relations”). 
 55. See, e.g., L.A. CTY. SUP. CT. LOCAL R. 5.2 (“All matters arising under the Family 
Code . . . are assigned to the Family Law Division.”). 
 56. WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 54, at 28.  For example, in Mississippi, the chancery 
court has jurisdiction over “domestic matters including adoptions, custody disputes and 
divorces.” About the Courts, ST. MISS. JUDICIARY, https://courts.ms.gov/aboutcourts/ 
aboutcourts.html [https://perma.cc/P4U2-BKF4] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 57. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 7, 1009–10 (2006); see, 
e.g., Family Courts, HAW. ST. JUDICIARY, http://www.courts.state.hi.us/courts/ 
family/family_courts [https://perma.cc/JE7T-QWHF] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 58. See VOLPP, supra note 42, at 32–33; see, e.g., supra notes 54, 56. 
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abusive partners.59  Survivors can also petition for child custody and 
visitation in family court to protect their children from their abusers.60  And 
family courts are a place where survivors can petition for civil orders of 
protection.61  Orders of protection come in several forms:  they can require 
the respondent to stop abusing the petitioner; to stay away from the petitioner 
and suspend all contact, including indirect contact; or even to leave the family 
home—all under threat of criminal penalties.62 
C.  Immigration Relief for Intimate Partner Violence Survivors 
Family courts are available to litigants irrespective of immigration status.63  
However, immigration relief for the undocumented already residing in the 
United States is limited.  There are two types of visas available to noncitizens:  
immigrant visas and nonimmigrant visas.64  Immigrant visas are generally 
available only to noncitizens who are sponsored by an employer65 or a family 
member who is a U.S. citizen or permanent resident,66 or through programs 
like the visa lottery.67  Nonimmigrant visas are generally available to 
travelers, students, reporters, and certain types of professionals like investors, 
athletes, clergy, and nurses, as well as other workers.68 
To be granted either type of visa, a noncitizen must be “admissible” to the 
United States.69  To be admissible, one must meet a series of stringent 
requirements.  Noncitizens must be healthy;70 have, at most, minimal 
criminal records;71 and be able to support themselves financially in the 
United States.72  One of the most significant barriers to admission for 
 
 59. See Sanctuary for Families, 2017 Autumn Uncontested Divorce Project Orientation 
26 (2017) (on file with author) (“[D]ivorce allows [survivors] to reclaim their previous identity 
which was systematically repressed by their abuser and empowers them by allowing them to 
break free from the abuser.”). 
 60. See VOLPP, supra note 42, at 33–34. 
 61. See id. at 30–32. 
 62. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 2018) (setting forth the possibilities 
for orders of protection in New York State family courts). 
 63. See VOLPP, supra note 42, at 30. 
 64. See Directory of Visa Categories, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, https://travel.state.gov/ 
content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/all-visa-categories.html 
[https://perma.cc/SMR4-2E9W] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 65. 9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 502.1-1(B) (2018) [hereinafter 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL], https://fam.state.gov/Fam/FAM.aspx?ID=09FAM 
[https://perma.cc/W7AG-NSW6]. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.; see id. § 502.6.  There are pending executive proposals to eliminate this program. 
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 2, 2017 11:33 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/926155393490878464 [https://perma.cc/5793-
MGT5] (“I am calling on Congress to TERMINATE the diversity visa lottery program that 
presents significant vulnerabilities to our national security.”). 
 68. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 65, § 402.1. 
 69. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012). 
 70. See id. § 1182(a)(1). 
 71. See id. § 1182(a)(2)–(3), (6), (10). 
 72. See id. § 1182(a)(4). 
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noncitizens is that unlawful presence can bar immigration relief for years,73 
which means that anyone who comes to the United States without 
documentation or who overstays a student or tourist visa is de facto ineligible 
for a visa. 
The U Visa was novel because the statute allows certain grounds of 
inadmissibility to be waived, which means that IPV survivors who are 
otherwise ineligible for visas because they have a criminal record or because 
they came to or stayed in the United States without documentation can still 
be granted a U Visa.74  Thus, for many undocumented IPV survivors, the 
U Visa is their only option for legal status. 
The BIWPA established U Visa criteria by amending the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA),75 the primary statutory source of immigration law in 
the United States.76  To qualify, an applicant must have been the victim of 
certain crimes, like domestic abuse and involuntary servitude; been 
substantially harmed; and aided a “law enforcement official,” prosecutor, 
judge, immigration authority, or another “local authorit[y]” investigating or 
prosecuting criminal activity.77  A U Visa holder is authorized to work in the 
United States for four years78 and has the opportunity to become a permanent 
resident after three years.79 
U Visas are administered by the United States Customs and Immigration 
Service (USCIS).80  USCIS is a division of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) tasked with processing citizenship applications, managing 
naturalization procedures, issuing immigrant and nonimmigrant visas,81 and 
handling various U.S. humanitarian programs.82  USCIS’s humanitarian 
programs grant specific immigration relief to specific classes of noncitizens, 
like asylum to refugees83 or expedited processing of applications for foreign 
nationals stranded in the United States because of a natural disaster.84  The 
 
 73. See id. § 1182(a)(9) (establishing the three- and ten-year bars for “unlawful 
presence”). 
 74. Ann Benson & Jonathan Moore, A Practice Guide for Representing U Visa Applicants 
with Criminal Convictions or Criminal History, ASISTA 4, http://www.asistahelp.org/ 
documents/resources/annie_Us_final_FA7D9E90456F8.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4BF-Q9CP] 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2018); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14). 
 75. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
§ 1513(b)–(d), 114 Stat. 1464, 1534–36 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15), 
1182, 1184). 
 76. See CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.02(3)(c) 
(2017).  
 77. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p) (2012). 
 78. See id. § 1184(o). 
 79. See id. § 1255(l). 
 80. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 76, § 28.02(1). 
 81. See id. § 1.02(2). 
 82. Humanitarian, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/ 
humanitarian [https://perma.cc/VKF9-4C99] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 83. Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/ 
humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum [https://perma.cc/BV7Y-6BEJ] (last visited Apr. 13, 
2018). 
 84. Tips for Foreign Nationals in the United States Impacted by Civil Unrest or Natural 
Disasters in Their Home Country, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/tips-foreign-nationals-united-states-impacted-civil-unrest-
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U Visa is one of these programs.85  The law authorizes USCIS to grant ten 
thousand U Visas annually.86 
USCIS has issued formal and informal guidance with respect to the U Visa 
process.  A federal regulation (the “U Visa Regulation”)87 establishes the 
required elements of a U Visa application:  a Petition for U Nonimmigrant 
Status (form I-918), a U Nonimmigrant Status Certification (form I-918, 
Supplement B), a personal statement, and biometric information.88  
Supplement B is the form of the required law enforcement certification 
indicating to USCIS that the applicant “has been, is being, or is likely to be 
helpful to an investigation or prosecution of . . . qualifying criminal 
activity.”89  USCIS has also issued an informal resource guide (“Resource 
Guide”),90 which is intended to explain the U Visa certification requirement 
to law enforcement agencies.91  The Resource Guide explains that while 
certifying an application does not automatically guarantee the applicant a 
U Visa, it is required for a U Visa petition to be considered.92 
This certification is one of the most difficult elements for survivors to 
obtain.93  Many agencies have instituted complicated, opaque procedures, 
have long processing times, and some refuse to certify without explanation.94  
In response, nonprofit organizations have long advocated for a broad and 
creative approach to the pursuit of U Visa applications.95 
 
or-natural-disasters-their-home-country [https://perma.cc/2XJF-ZZNW] (last visited Apr. 13, 
2018); see, e.g., Press Release, USCIS, USCIS Reminds Filipino Nationals Impacted by 
Typhoon Haiyan of Available Immigration Relief Measures (Nov. 15, 2013), 
https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-reminds-filipino-nationals-impacted-typhoon-
haiyan-available-immigration-relief-measures [https://perma.cc/2VHY-SYED] (reminding 
victims of the 2013 typhoon “Yolanda” in the Philippines of immigration relief available). 
 85. See Humanitarian, supra note 82 (describing the visas for “Victims of Human 
Trafficking & Other Crimes”). 
 86. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(2)(A) (2012). 
 87. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (2018). 
 88. See id. § 214.14(c).  The forms and instructions are available at I-918, Petition for U 
Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/i-918 
[https://perma.cc/GD9J-U2TR] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 89. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(2)(i). 
 90. See generally DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U AND T VISA LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCE 
GUIDE (2016) [hereinafter DHS RESOURCE GUIDE], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/publications/U-and-T-Visa-Law-Enforcement-Resource%20Guide_1.4.16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F7WM-SRF8]. 
 91. See id. at 3. 
 92. Id. at 6 (“[B]y signing a U Visa certification, the certifying agency . . . is not 
sponsoring or endorsing the victim for a U Visa, and the completed certification does not 
guarantee that USCIS will approve the U Visa petition.” (emphasis removed)). 
 93. See supra note 11. 
 94. See Nanasi, supra note 11 (manuscript at 32–33); Abuelita Genoveva Sues Department 
of Homeland Security as Part of Effort to Stop Her Deportation, OCAD (Sept. 18, 2017), 
http://organizedcommunities.org/abuelita-genoveva-sues-department-of-homeland-security-
as-part-of-effort-to-stop-her-deportation [https://perma.cc/NQM7-WF66] (“Delays in the 
USCIS adjudication process have caused U Visa applicants to wait as much as three years for 
decisions on their applications.”). 
 95. See, e.g., AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, RESOURCE LIST:  WORKING MORE 
EFFECTIVELY WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT TO OBTAIN U VISA CERTIFICATIONS (2015), 
http://www.asistahelp.org/documents/resources/LEAs_and_U_visas_Resource_List__Mar_0
D3F1275EDAC4.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3YZ-8GR3]; NIWPA MEMORANDUM, supra note 
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After submission, USCIS officials engage in an intense review process96 
to determine whether to issue a U Visa.97  The decision is reviewable de novo 
by the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO).98  AAO decisions are final.99 
II.  INTERPRETING THE U VISA STATUTES 
USCIS is authorized to grant U Visas where (1) the survivor “has suffered 
substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been a victim of 
criminal activity”;100 (2) the survivor “has been helpful, is being helpful, or 
is likely to be helpful to a Federal, State, or local law enforcement official, to 
a Federal, State, or local prosecutor, to a Federal or State judge, to [DHS], or 
to other Federal, State, or local authorities investigating or prosecuting 
criminal activity”; and (3) “the criminal activity . . . violated the laws of the 
United States or occurred in the United States.”101  To enable this fact-finding 
process, a U Visa petition must include, as set forth in the BIWPA: 
[A] certification from a Federal, State, or local law enforcement official, 
prosecutor, judge, or other Federal, State, or local authority investigating 
 
19; see also N.Y. STATE JUDICIAL COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, IMMIGRATION AND 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  A SHORT GUIDE FOR NEW YORK STATE JUDGES 3 (2009), 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/womeninthecourts/pdfs/ImmigrationandDomesticViolence.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2L3Y-96Q4] (“Cooperating in an abuse and neglect proceeding or 
giving evidence in a family offense case in Family Court, for example, may qualify as assisting 
with the investigation of a crime.”).  Organizations also have a long-standing practice of 
sharing information about the certification requirements promulgated by different agencies. 
See, e.g., ICWC U Visa Zoho Database, IMMIGR. CTR. FOR WOMEN & CHILDREN, 
http://icwclaw.org/services-available/icwc-u-travel-and-certifier-database/ [https://perma.cc/ 
DHF9-KBQT] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (providing a regularly updated, members-only 
database that currently lists 983 agencies that have certified U Visa applications, ranging from 
police departments, district attorneys’ offices, state departments of labor, and local child 
protective services agencies). 
 96. DHS RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 90, at 5.  For example, USCIS fingerprints and 
conducts background checks on all applicants. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(3) (2018).  USCIS 
may also contact the Supplement B signatory for additional information. DHS RESOURCE 
GUIDE, supra note 90, at 5. 
 97. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 76, § 28.02(1). 
 98. USCIS, ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE PRACTICE MANUAL §§ 1.4(a), 3.4 (2016), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/AAO/Practice%20Manual/AAO_Prac
tice_Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUT5-2CAH]. 
 99. See id. §§ 3.2(d)–(e), 3.14.  While an applicant may seek judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedures Act, any review will likely be highly deferential. See, e.g., 
Bazaldua-Hernandez v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1383, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149283, at *8 (C.D. 
Cal. Oct. 26, 2016) (describing the standard of review in a petition for judicial review of an 
AAO denial of a U Visa). 
 100. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I) (2012).  Qualifying criminal activity is defined as: 
[I]nvolving one or more of the following or any similar activity in violation of 
Federal, State, or local criminal law:  rape; torture; trafficking; incest; domestic 
violence; sexual assault; abusive sexual contact; prostitution; sexual exploitation; 
female genital mutilation; being held hostage; peonage; involuntary servitude; slave 
trade; kidnapping; abduction; unlawful criminal restraint; false imprisonment; 
blackmail; extortion; manslaughter; murder; felonious assault; witness tampering; 
obstruction of justice; perjury; or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any 
of the above mentioned crimes. 
Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii). 
 101. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(IV). 
2018] U VISAS AND FAMILY COURTS 2937 
criminal activity . . . .  This certification shall state that the alien “has been 
helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful” in the investigation or 
prosecution of criminal activity.102 
This Part demonstrates that this provision (the “Certification Statute”) 
authorizes family courts to certify U Visa applications.  This Part interprets 
the Certification Statute using relevant tools of statutory interpretation and 
construction. 
The tools of statutory interpretation are plentiful and heavily debated.103  
This Part analyzes the Certification Statute using two general categories of 
interpretative tools:  textual and legal process.104  Part II.A will engage in a 
textual analysis of the Certification Statute, and Part II.B engages in a legal 
process analysis, examining the BIWPA’s legislative and statutory history. 
A.  A Textual Analysis of the BIWPA 
Courts and scholars generally agree that any analysis of the law should 
begin with the text.105  However, the appropriate approach to the text is less 
certain, with different judges advocating for different methods.106  This Note 
utilizes several of these methods to determine that family courts are 
authorized by the Certification Statute to certify U Visa applications. 
The Certification Statute allows for “a certification from a . . . State . . . 
judge . . . that the alien ‘has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be 
helpful’ in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity.”107  There 
are two questions raised by this text:  (1) whether “State . . . judge” includes 
state family court judges and, if so, (2) whether the family court judge must 
be investigating criminal activity in order to certify. 
1.  Family Court Judges as State Judges 
This first question, whether “State . . . judge” includes state family court 
judges, can be formulated another way:  Does the text surrounding “State . . . 
judge” narrow the meaning of the term and, thus, exclude family court 
judges?  The key to understanding text is understanding the ordinary meaning 
of its words:  how a reasonable person would read the word in its everyday 
context.108  Justice Antonin Scalia described this as “whether you could use 
the word in that sense at a cocktail party without having people look at you 
 
 102. Id. § 1184(p)(1). 
 103. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and 
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). 
 104. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J. 
BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 424, 644 (5th ed. 2014). 
 105. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW 26 (2016) (“Like Justice Scalia, we 
are all textualists:  The starting point and usually the answer to a statutory problem is a fair 
reading of the statutory text on point.”). 
 106. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 104, at 645–90. 
 107. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1). 
 108. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 69–71 (2012). 
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funny.”109  If family law is always the jurisdiction of the states,110 it follows 
that family court judges are always state judges.  In its everyday context, a 
family court judge is a state judge, and this designation would draw no 
strange looks over a martini.111 
However, plain meaning is not always dispositive.  For example, in Yates 
v. United States,112 the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a fish was a 
tangible object and decided, all plain meaning and dictionary definitions 
aside, that a fish was not a tangible object within the meaning of the statute 
in question.113  Instead, the Court concluded, “‘Tangible object’ . . . is better 
read to cover only objects one can use to record or preserve information, not 
all objects in the physical world.”114  In Yates, the Court applied noscitur a 
sociis115 to narrow the meaning of “tangible object” in the context of the 
surrounding terms, which all related to documents and records.116 
In the Certification Statute, “judge” is surrounded by “law enforcement 
official,” “prosecutor,” and “other . . . authority investigating criminal 
activity.”117  Here, noscitur a sociis could be applied to narrow “judge” to 
include only a criminal judge as the surrounding language implies a criminal 
nature.  However, noscitur a sociis “is not dispositive if other statutory 
context suggests a broader reading.”118 
Courts utilize other textual aids to determine textual meaning.  In Yates, 
Justice Ginsburg discussed another supportive, but not dispositive, textual 
aid:  titles.119  The title of a statute or section can provide context to help 
resolve ambiguity in statutory interpretation.120  In Yates, the statute in 
question included statute and section titles that supported a narrow 
construction of “tangible object.”121  Here, the statute and section titles 
surrounding the Certification Statute are almost uniformly survivor focused:  
“Establishment of Humanitarian/Material Witness Non-Immigrant 
Classification,”122 “Protection for Certain Crime Victims Including Victims 
of Crimes Against Women,”123 “Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act 
 
 109. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 110. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 111. Cf. KRAMER VS. KRAMER (Columbia Pictures 1979) (“Well the problem is that your 
mommy and I both want you to live with us, see, so that’s why we decided to go see this man, 
who I told you is the judge, and we let him decide because he’s very wise and experienced 
about these things.”); WHAT MAISIE KNEW (Red Crown Productions 2012) (“Your mother 
would have a fit, but I don’t think I’d have a problem squaring it with the judge.”). 
 112. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). 
 113. See id. at 1081–89. 
 114. Id. at 1081. 
 115. See id. at 1085 (“[T]he principle . . . [that] a word is known by the company it keeps.”). 
 116. Id. at 1085–86. 
 117. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1) (2012). 
 118. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 408. 
 119. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1083–84. 
 120. See ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 412; ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 104, at 675–
76; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 108, at 221–24. 
 121. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1083–84. 
 122. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
§ 1513(b), 114 Stat. 1464, 1534 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012)). 
 123. Id. § 1513, 114 Stat. at 1533. 
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of 2000,”124 “Violence Against Women Act of 2000,”125 and the “Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.”126  This suggests that a 
statutory reading should also be survivor focused and that the appropriate 
reading of the Certification Statute should be broad, to protect as many 
survivors as possible.  To limit “judges” strictly to criminal judges would 
exclude all IPV survivors where prosecutors have declined to prosecute and 
law enforcement officials have declined to investigate.127  It would also deny 
relief to IPV survivors who do not choose to seek criminal assistance, either 
out of fear of their abuser or deportation. 
Purpose clauses can also aid textual construction.128  The purpose clause 
of the U Visa provision of the BIWPA states that the law is designed to 
“offer[] protection to victims . . . in keeping with the humanitarian interests 
of the United States.”129  The purpose clause further explains, without 
qualification, that “[p]roviding temporary legal status to aliens who have 
been severely victimized by criminal activity also comports with the 
humanitarian interests of the United States.”130  But this clause also expounds 
another purpose:  to “strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to 
detect, investigate, and prosecute cases of domestic violence”131 with the 
goal of “facilitat[ing] the reporting of crimes to law enforcement officials by 
. . . abused aliens who are not in lawful immigration status.”132  The purpose 
clause of the entire BIWPA reflects this dual purpose, as well.133  The first 
stated purpose of the BIWPA is to “remove barriers to criminal prosecutions 
of” abusers,134 while the second stated purpose is “to offer protection” to 
survivors.135 
The BIWPA states the congressional findings upon which it is premised in 
its introductory clause:  “[P]roviding battered immigrant women and children 
who were experiencing domestic violence at home with protection against 
deportation allows them to obtain protection orders against their abusers and 
frees them to cooperate with law enforcement and prosecutors in criminal 
cases.”136  These introductory clauses indicate that a balance must be struck 
between the government’s interests in protecting survivors and prosecuting 
abusers.  This suggests that “State . . . judge” could mean both the criminal 
 
 124. Id. § 1501, 114 Stat. at 1518. 
 125. Id. § 1001, 114 Stat. at 1491. 
 126. Id. § 1, 114 Stat. at 1464. 
 127. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 128. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 412 (“Statutory provisions setting forth Congress’s 
purposes should be given great weight in understanding the legislative purpose(s).”); SCALIA 
& GARNER, supra note 108, at 217–20 (“A . . . purpose clause . . . is a permissible indicator of 
meaning.”). 
 129. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 1513(a)(2)(A), 114 Stat. at 
1533–34. 
 130. See id. § 1513(a)(2)(B), 114 Stat. at 1534. 
 131. Id. § 1513(a)(2)(A), 114 Stat. at 1533–34. 
 132. Id. § 1513(a)(2)(B), 114 Stat. at 1534. 
 133. See id. § 1502(b)(1), 114 Stat. at 1518. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. § 1502(b)(2), 114 Stat. at 1518. 
 136. Id. § 1502(a)(2), 114 Stat. at 1518 (emphasis added). 
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judge that oversees prosecution of an abuser and the family court judge that 
oversees the civil proceeding allowing an IPV survivor to protect herself. 
Judge Frank Easterbrook explains that regulations can also be a useful 
textual aid to statutory interpretation:  “Let us not pretend that texts answer 
every question . . . .  [T]he interpreter should go to some other source of rules, 
including administrative agencies . . . .”137  This echoes the suggestion by 
Professors Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks that agencies have useful 
technical expertise and more time to sensibly interpret statutory language.138 
The U Visa Regulation enumerates a list of certifying agencies, including 
“agencies that have criminal investigative jurisdiction in their respective 
areas of expertise, including, but not limited to, child protective services, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Department of 
Labor.”139  The Resource Guide defines certifying agencies as “Federal, 
State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial government agencies that have criminal, 
civil, or administrative investigative or prosecutorial authority.”140  This 
shows that USCIS understands the language in the Certification Statute to 
include civil agencies like the EEOC—one that is, by design, essentially 
powerless.141  It must, therefore, understand the language to include a state 
judge with the power to make substantive rules of law. 
Ultimately, the text of the Certification Statute, interpreted with the 
assistance of textual aids like dictionaries, language canons, and agency 
interpretation, authorizes family courts to certify U Visa applications. 
2.  Family Court Judges as Investigators of Criminal Activity 
Another key issue in interpreting the Certification Statute is whether, to 
make the certification, the certifying agency must be the entity investigating 
or prosecuting criminal activity.  The Certification Statute requires that the 
law enforcement certification state that the U Visa petitioner “has been 
helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful” in the investigation of 
criminal activity.142 
The statute presents two different answers.  First, a linguistic canon, the 
last antecedent rule, suggests that the signatory of the certification is not 
required to be the authority investigating criminal activity.  The last 
antecedent rule dictates that “qualifying words or phrases refer only to the 
last antecedent, unless contrary to the apparent legislative intent derived from 
the sense of the entire enactment.”143  The Certification Statute defines those 
 
 137. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1993). 
 138. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:  BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1290 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994). 
 139. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2) (2018). 
 140. DHS RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 90, at 6. 
 141. See Chuck Henson, In Defense of McDonnell Douglas:  The Domination of Title VII 
by the At-Will Employment Doctrine, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 551, 564–66 (2015). 
 142. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1) (2012). 
 143. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 104, at 670–71; see, e.g., Lockhart v. United States, 
136 S. Ct. 958, 962–63 (2016) (holding that, in a statute listing “aggravated sexual abuse, 
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who can make a certification as follows:  “[A] Federal, State, or local law 
enforcement official, prosecutor, judge, or other Federal, State, or local 
authority investigating criminal activity.”144  Here, the qualifying words are 
“investigating criminal activity,” and the last antecedent is “other Federal, 
State, or local authority.”  Applying the last antecedent rule, “investigating 
criminal activity” relates only to the last antecedent, not to the preceding 
certifying officials.  This means that the signatory does not need to be 
investigating criminal activity unless “structural or contextual evidence . . . 
‘rebut[s] the last antecedent inference.’”145 
Second, and conversely, using agency guidance as a textual aid, as Judge 
Easterbrook proposed,146 the U Visa Regulation rebuts the last antecedent 
inference.  The U Visa Regulation states that a certifying judge must have 
“responsibility for the investigation . . . of a qualifying crime or criminal 
activity.”147  Thus, if any judge issuing a U Visa certification is required to 
conduct an “investigation” of criminal activity, what constitutes an 
“investigation” must be understood.  This Part asks whether a family court 
does investigate criminal activity by exploring what constitutes an 
investigation. 
An ordinary understanding of investigation is not restricted to the work of 
a criminal court—the word has wide and general applications beyond 
criminal law.  Documentary filmmakers investigate their subjects,148 
scientists investigate the natural world,149 artists undertake artistic 
investigation,150 and there are investigative journalists,151 insurance 
 
sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward,” “involving a minor or 
ward” applies only to “abusive sexual conduct,” not “aggravated sexual abuse” and “sexual 
abuse”). 
 144. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1). 
 145. See Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 965 (quoting Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 543 
U.S. 335, 344 n.4 (2005)). 
 146. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 147. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2) (2018).  The insertion of the comma after “other authority” 
indicates USCIS’s intention to rebut the last antecedent rule. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra 
note 104, at 671. 
 148. See, e.g., Jordan Raup, Errol Morris on Investigation, The B-Side, and 
Unpredictability, FILM SOC’Y LINCOLN CTR. (July 10, 2017), https://www.filmlinc.org/daily/ 
errol-morris-on-investigation-the-b-side-and-unpredictability [https://perma.cc/3E2E-8JZY] 
(quoting the documentary filmmaker Errol Morris as saying, “I think I’m an investigator at 
heart”). 
 149. E.g., JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 505 (16th ed. 1992) (quoting biologist 
Thomas Henry Huxley as saying, “The method of scientific investigation is nothing but the 
expression of the necessary mode of working of the human mind”). 
 150. E.g., Holland Cotter, Ellsworth Kelly, Who Shaped Geometries on a Bold Scale, Dies 
at 92, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/arts/ellsworth-kelly-
artist-who-mixed-european-abstraction-into-everyday-life-dies-at-92.html [https://perma.cc/ 
YUK5-6WEG] (quoting the late abstract artist Ellsworth Kelly as saying, “To me the 
investigation of perception was of the greatest interest”). 
 151. E.g., ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (Warner Brothers 1976) (“Well, if you’re conducting 
that kind of investigation, certainly it comes as no surprise to you to know that Howard was 
with the CIA.”). 
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investigators,152 and private investigators.153  The Google search method, 
utilized by Judge Richard Posner in United States v. Costello,154 which is 
meant to offer contextual clues to understanding terms,155 reveals more 
examples of criminal investigation than not (“bureau of investigation,” 
“crime investigation,” “criminal investigation,” “fbi investigation,” “crime 
scene investigation”),156 but the results are also driven by recent, high-profile 
criminal investigations.157 
Other textual aids echo this broad reading.  The Supreme Court uses two 
other methods to understand ordinary meaning:  looking to usages of words 
by the press158 and in popular culture.159  A search of “investigation” in the 
New York Times database from the year of the BIWPA’s enactment echoes a 
 
 152. Cf. DOUBLE INDEMNITY (Paramount Pictures 1944) (“A claims man is a doctor and a 
bloodhound and a cop and a judge and a jury and a father confessor all in one.”). 
 153. E.g., Veronica Mars:  Pilot (UPN television broadcast Sept. 22, 2004) (“My after-
school job means tailing philandering spouses or investigating false injury claims.”). 
 154. 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 155. See id. at 1044–45 (googling phrases like “harboring fugitives” and “harboring guests” 
to interpret “to harbor”). 
 156. Investigation, GOOGLE TRENDS, https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date= 
all&geo=US&q=investigation [https://perma.cc/7PFL-8RZB] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) 
(“Related queries” box, sorted by “Top,” listing results from 2004 to present). 
 157. The results include “trump investigation,” “hillary investigation,” “mueller 
investigation,” and “russia investigation” as of March 13, 2018. See Investigation, supra note 
156 (“Related queries” box, sorted by “Rising,” listing results from 2004 to present).  This is 
echoed in results from previous years. See, e.g., Investigation, GOOGLE TRENDS, 
https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=2006-01-01%202006-12-31&geo= 
US&q=investigation [https://perma.cc/FAR9-8WQ5] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (“Related 
queries” box, sorted by “Rising,” listing results from 2006, including “duke lacrosse 
investigation”); Investigation, GOOGLE TRENDS, https://trends.google.com/trends/ 
explore?date=2015-01-01%202015-12-31&geo=US&q=investigation [https://perma.cc/HR 
29-EFMT] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (“Related queries” box, sorted by “Rising,” listing top 
result for 2015, including “patrick kane investigation”). 
 158. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129–30 (1998) (interpreting “to 
carry” by using citations to the New York Times, Boston Globe, Colorado Springs Gazette 
Telegraph, Arkansas Gazette, and San Diego Union-Tribune).  The Court’s interpretation in 
Muscarello was subsequently overruled by an act of Congress. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra 
note 104, at 707. 
 159. Compare Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 129 (citing Robinson Crusoe and Moby Dick), with 
id. at 144 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing The Magnificent Seven and M*A*S*H). 
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primarily,160 but not exclusively, criminal connotation.161  Examples from 
popular culture can be found in criminal162 and noncriminal contexts.163 
Dictionaries164 support this inclusive reading.  General dictionaries 
uniformly define investigation as a detailed and systematic inquiry.165  Legal 
dictionaries speak more particularly about official and procedural elements, 
sometimes criminal166 and sometimes administrative.167 
These dictionary definitions are reflected in agency regulations.  The 
U Visa Regulation writes a new word into the Certification Statute:  
“detection.”168  As a textual aid to investigation, this addition shows that 
 
 160. See, e.g., David Johnston, The 2000 Campaign:  The Investigation; an Old Issue 
Returns to Haunt Reno Again, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2000/06/26/us/the-2000-campaign-the-investigation-an-old-issue-returns-to-haunt-reno-
again.html [https://perma.cc/V39S-YKAA] (discussing the criminal investigation into Al 
Gore’s 1996 campaign fundraising); Tina Kelley, Stolen Trailer Found in Queens, but Cargo 
of Cyanide Is Missing, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2000/05/13/nyregion/stolen-trailer-found-in-queens-but-cargo-of-cyanide-is-missing.html 
[http://perma.cc/6WPZ-8A7V] (discussing an FBI investigation into stolen toxins). 
 161. See, e.g., James P. Harley, Letter to the Editor, Anthrax Hunting, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/16/books/l-anthrax-hunting-247588.html 
[https://perma.cc/E5LS-2ZLW] (discussing a book about a 1979 scientific investigation into 
an anthrax outbreak); Stephanie Strom, N.T.T. Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/25/business/world-business-briefing-asia-ntt-
investigation.html [https://perma.cc/EF5F-6NMA] (reporting on a Japanese agency 
investigation into a possible telecommunications monopoly). 
 162. E.g., Law & Order:  Aftershock (NBC television broadcast May 22, 1996) (“In the 
criminal justice system, the people are represented by two separate yet equally important 
groups:  the police who investigate crime and the district attorneys who prosecute the 
offenders.  These are their stories.”). 
 163. E.g., Star Trek:  The Galileo Seven (NBC television broadcast Jan. 5, 1967) 
(“Captain’s log, star date 2821.5. . . .  Our course leads us past Murasaki 312, a quasar-like 
formation.  Vague, undefined.  Priceless opportunity for scientific investigation.”). 
 164. There has been a recent surge in dictionary use in Supreme Court opinions. See 
generally James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage:  The Supreme Court’s Thirst 
for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483 (2013).  
Legal scholars examining this phenomenon attribute this rise, at least partially, to the Court 
attempting to rebut accusations of judicial activism by focusing on these neutral-appearing 
sources. See id. at 490–92.  This Note will use the dictionaries favored by the Supreme Court, 
both general and legal. See id. at 529–31.  And to understand the meaning of “investigation” 
at the time of passage of the BIWPA, this Note only uses dictionary editions in circulation at 
the time of the passage of the BIWPA. See id. at 511–12. 
 165. See Investigation, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1996) (“detailed inquiry 
or systematic examination”); Investigation, RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED 
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1997) (“a searching inquiry for ascertaining facts”); Investigation, 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (“the making of a search or inquiry; systematic 
examination; careful and minute research”); Investigation, WEBSTER’S SECOND NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1957) (“thorough inquiry”); Investigation, WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1986) (“detailed examination” and 
“searching inquiry”). 
 166. See Investigate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). 
 167. See Investigation, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969) (“[a]n administrative 
function”). 
 168. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(5) (2018) (defining “investigation or prosecution” as “the 
detection or investigation of a qualifying crime or criminal activity, as well as to the 
prosecution, conviction, or sentencing of the perpetrator of the qualifying crime or criminal 
activity” (emphasis added)). 
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USCIS understands “investigation” to require something more than simply 
identifying criminal activity—something like a systematic inquiry. 
Guided by these insights, a family court certainly investigates during 
adjudication.  For example, a family court engages in a systematic inquiry of 
finances in domestic support cases169 and of parental fitness in custody and 
visitation cases.170  And a family court investigates criminal activity in some 
specific proceedings, like petitions for orders of protection and violations of 
granted orders of protection, divorce applications, and, often, custody and 
visitation cases.171  By a textual analysis alone, a family court does 
investigate criminal activity172 and is authorized to certify U Visa 
applications by its litigants. 
This Part discussed two questions:  (1) whether “State . . . judge” includes 
state family court judges and, if so, (2) whether the family court judge must 
be investigating criminal activity in order to certify.  To answer the first 
question, this Part applied noscitur a sociis and examined relevant section 
and statutory titles, purpose clauses, and agency guidance to determine that 
state judge does include state family court judges.173  To answer the second 
question, this Part applied the last antecedent rule and agency guidance as a 
textual aid to find ambiguity in the text.  According to the last antecedent 
rule, a family court judge does not need to be investigating criminal activity 
in order to certify a U Visa application, while agency guidance suggests the 
opposite interpretation.174  Further textual analysis indicates that the 
Certification Statute authorizes family courts to certify U Visa applications 
in either case.  Ordinary meaning, dictionaries, press usage, and the Google-
search method define “investigation” broadly as a systematic inquiry,175 
which a family court clearly engages in.176  Taken together, a textual analysis 
indicates that the Certification Statute authorizes family courts to certify 
U Visa applications. 
 
 169. E.g., McGill v. McGill, 801 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (remanding a 
child-support case to the trial court for “further investigation” into a parent’s finances). 
 170. E.g., Ching v. Ching, No. 23952, 2003 Haw. App. LEXIS 187, at *4 (Ct. App. June 
16, 2003) (discussing the need for “an investigation of the current custody and visitation 
arrangements”); State ex rel. Reitz v. Ringer, 510 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Neb. 1994) (explaining 
that the trial court acquired temporary custody of the subject child to “further investigate the 
issue of permanent custody”). 
 171. See, e.g., W. VA. RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE FOR FAM. CT. 48a(b) (prescribing 
that “the circuit court may utilize the investigative and mandamus process” in child abuse and 
neglect proceedings). 
 172. But see Nipper v. Snipes, 7 F.3d 415, 417 (4th Cir. 1993) (ruling that, for the purposes 
of one of the hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[a] judge in a civil trial is 
not an investigator, rather a judge”).  The Nipper holding, however, is not based on textual 
arguments. See id. 
 173. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 174. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 175. See supra Part II.A.2.i. 
 176. See supra Part II.A.2.i. 
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B.  A Legal Process Analysis of the BIWPA 
This Part engages with two key methods of legal process theory to address 
the question of whether family courts are authorized under the Certification 
Statute to certify U Visa applications.  “The legal process methodology was 
the dominant mode for thinking about statutes for a generation and, in fact, 
remains highly relevant to issues of statutory interpretation.”177  Two leading 
legal process scholars, Professors Hart and Sacks, hypothesized that “[t]he 
meaning of a statute is never plain unless it fits with some intelligible 
purpose” and wrote that “[t]he first task in the interpretation of any statute 
. . . is to determine what purpose ought to be attributed to it.”178  And as a 
way of discerning this purpose, courts looked to a statute’s legislative 
history.179  New textualists have heavily criticized this method as imprecise, 
“unnecessary[,] or even inadmissible.”180  But even new textualists have 
found it necessary to apply this kind of analysis in certain areas.181 
Proponents of the legal process school of statutory interpretation maintain 
that it is the duty of courts, as faithful agents of the legislature,182 to follow 
legislative history because, while imperfect, it is the clearest indication of the 
will of Congress.183  Courts are especially inclined to apply a legal process 
analysis to the Immigration and Nationality Act.184 
 
 177. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 104, at 506. 
 178. See HART & SACKS, supra note 138, at 1124–25 (emphasis omitted). 
 179. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 198–99. 
 180. Id. at 201; see, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 137, at 62 (“Am I not a notorious 
opponent of legislative history?  That is indeed my position, and it grows out of a belief that 
becoming accustomed to mining the debates for clues creates some profound and unwelcome 
changes in how judges see laws.”). 
 181. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise 
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1686–92 (2004) (describing the Rehnquist Court’s 
strong purposivist approach to state sovereign immunity jurisprudence). 
 182. See Judith S. Kaye, Things Judges Do:  State Statutory Interpretation, 13 TOURO L. 
REV. 595, 604 (1997) (“[I]n matters of statutory interpretation, the judiciary must bend to the 
legislative command.  That is the oath and obligation of every judge.” (footnote omitted)). 
 183. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 343 (1986) (“[O]fficial statements of 
purpose, . . . established by the practice of legislative history, should be treated as themselves 
acts of the state personified.”); ESKRIDGE JR., supra note, 105 at 209 (“Reliable legislative 
materials ought to be a rich source of guidance when interpreters figure out the ordinary 
meaning of statutory language, read in light of the statutory purpose, both understood through 
the eyes of the legislators responsible for the statute.”); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, 
Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 77 
(1994) (“Legislative history . . . can supply information about how the statute is expected to 
operate, what subjects it addresses, what problems it seeks to solve, what objectives it tries to 
accomplish, and what means it employs to reach those objectives . . . .”). 
 184. In 1973, the Ninth Circuit considered the applications by three paroled noncitizens for 
permanent residency status. Yuen Sang Low v. Attorney Gen., 479 F.2d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 
1973).  In evaluating whether the three applicants had met the statutory requirement of being 
“physically present” in the United States for seven years, the court rejected the literal meaning 
of “physically present” because “we are in the never-never land of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, where plain words do not always mean what they say.” See id.; cf. MARY 
MARTIN & KATHY NOLAN, Never Never Land, on PETER PAN ORIGINAL BROADWAY CAST 
(RCA Victor 1954) (“I have a place where dreams are born and time is never planned, it’s not 
on any chart, you must find it with your heart:  never never land.”).  The Ninth Circuit instead 
looked to other factors, including legislative history. See Yuen Sang Low, 479 F.2d at 822–23. 
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This Part takes two legal process approaches to analyzing the BIWPA.  
Part II.B.1 examines the legislative history of the statute using a variety of 
legislative materials.  Part II.B.2 seeks to understand the general purpose of 
the statute using statutory history. 
1.  Legislative History of the BIWPA 
The Supreme Court has considered a wide variety of legislative 
materials—ranging from an unsigned, handwritten “slip of paper”185 to 
district court case citations in a committee report186—as representative of a 
statute’s legislative history.  However, scholars describe a hierarchy of 
materials.  Conference reports and committee reports are given the most 
weight, followed by the statements of supporters, congressional silence, and 
subsequent statutory history.187  Executive statements, like presidential 
signing or veto statements, are given the least weight.188  This Part provides 
a brief overview of the legislative history of the BIWPA and then examines 
each of these materials in depth. 
The initial version of the BIWPA, the Battered Immigrant Women 
Protection Act of 1999 (“BIWPA 1999”), contained the first iteration of the 
U Visa.189  BIWPA 1999 proposed to grant two thousand U Visas annually 
to noncitizens who had suffered significant abuse, possessed “material 
information concerning criminal or other unlawful activity,” and were willing 
to share, or have shared, that information with a law enforcement or 
administrative agency.190 
There was a hearing on BIWPA 1999 in July 2000.191  A few months later, 
bill sponsors Representatives Sheila Jackson Lee and Jan Schakowsky 
successfully moved to include BIWPA 1999 in the Victims of Trafficking 
and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA),192 a bill aimed at combating 
human trafficking, especially sex trafficking.193  In conference, a bipartisan 
group of senators incorporated the reauthorization of the Violence Against 
Women Act into VTVPA, as well.194  The conference report on VTVPA 
 
 185. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 588 (7th ed. 2015) (discussing the importance of such a document, 
thought to be drafted by Senator Ellsworth during the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, in 
the Court’s decision in Erie). 
 186. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her citation 
of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of the land, thereafter dutifully 
to be observed by the Supreme Court itself.”). 
 187. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 240; ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 36 (1997). 
 188. See ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 254–56. 
 189. See H.R. 3083, 106th Cong. § 13(b) (1999). 
 190. Id. § 13(b)–(c). 
 191. See generally BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1. 
 192. See 146 CONG. REC. H7630–31 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2000). 
 193. See H.R. 3244, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999). 
 194. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,182 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“[I]n 
light of the unwillingness of the Senate Republican leadership to allow the Senate to act on 
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included the reauthorization of VAWA (“VAWA 2000”), which included the 
BIWPA.195  This report contained a revised version of the U Visa. 
BIWPA 1999 proposed only an optional law enforcement certification.196  
And BIWPA 1999 expressly proposed that this optional certification could 
be made by a civil court or agency.197  However, the revised U Visa 
provisions in VTVPA mandate, not suggest, a law enforcement certification, 
and its text does not expressly include civil court action or investigation.198  
VTVPA, which included this version of the U Visa, was enacted in October 
2000.199 
a.  Conference and Committee Reports 
The BIWPA conference report supports broad U Visa certification.  In 
analyzing legislative history, conference and committee reports are given 
special weight.200  The discussion of the U Visa in these reports is minimal, 
but the conference report of VTVPA explains that the BIWPA “makes some 
targeted improvements that our experience with the original [VAWA] has 
shown to be necessary,” such as “[s]trengthening and refining the protections 
for battered immigrant women.”201  In its section-by-section analysis, the 
report described the U Visa as being “for victims of certain serious crimes 
that tend to target vulnerable foreign individuals without immigration 
status.”202  It also described the certification requirement:  “a judge certifies 
that the victim has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful in 
investigating or prosecuting the crime.”203 
 
[VAWA 2000] and the lapse of its authorization, I joined with Senator Biden and Senator 
Hatch to add it to the sex trafficking conference report we now consider.”). 
 195. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 103, 115 (2000) (Conf. Rep.); 146 CONG. REC. H9034 
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 2000) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee) (“Mr. Speaker, I do want to thank the 
conference committee for putting in the elements dealing with battered immigrant 
women . . . .”). 
 196. H.R. 3083, 106th Cong. § 13(b)(3) (1999) (requiring only “credible evidence,” which 
“may include certification from . . . law enforcement” (emphasis added)). 
 197. See id. (providing that certification could come “from a Federal or State law 
enforcement officer or prosecutor or a Federal or State official responsible for bringing 
enforcement actions that the alien is willing to cooperate or has cooperated in a criminal or 
civil court action or investigation or Federal or State administrative agency enforcement action 
or investigation”). 
 198. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012). 
 199. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also Press Release, 
Representative Schakowsky, Schakowsky Provisions to Protect Battered Immigrant Women 
and to Expand Transitional Housing for Domestic Abuse Victims Passed House, Included in 
Bill to Reauthorize VAWA and to Combat Trafficking of Women and Children into Sex Trade 
(Oct. 6, 2000), https://schakowsky.house.gov/press-releases/schakowsky-provisions-to-
protect-battered-immigrant-women-and-to-expand-transitional-housing-for-domestic-abuse-
victims-passed-house-included-in-bill-to-reauthorize-vawa-and-to-combat-trafficking-of-
women-and-children-into-sex-traden [https://perma.cc/6UPG-8LNN]. 
 200. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 240–45. 
 201. H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 103 (2000) (Conf. Rep.). 
 202. Id. at 115. 
 203. Id. 
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It is important that the U Visa is described only in terms of helping 
survivors and that the certification requirement is not described as a tool to 
reduce immigration fraud.204  This indicates that the congressional purpose 
was to help as many survivors as possible.  And this purpose would be best 
served by allowing as many agencies as possible to certify U Visa 
applications, including family courts. 
b.  Supporters’ Statements 
The statements of a bill’s supporters, especially its sponsors, are given 
some weight in a legal process analysis of specific legislative intent.205  The 
statements of supporters about the U Visa in the House and Senate during the 
legislative process were rich and evocative but not necessarily indicative of 
the intent of Congress as a whole.206 
The U Visa had a winding road to enactment.  Initially included in the 
BIWPA proposed in 1999, the provisions were altered and included in 
VAWA 2000 which was, in conference, incorporated into VTVPA.207  
Supporters and sponsors spoke at length throughout this process, and their 
statements illuminate the original intent of the U Visa and the meaning of the 
legislative changes. 
The BIWPA was initially proposed in the House of Representatives by 
Representative Schakowsky.208  Schakowsky proposed the bill in October 
1999, during Domestic Violence Awareness Month.209  She spoke 
sympathetically about the wide-ranging effects of intimate partner violence, 
especially on undocumented immigrants.210  She explained that the BIWPA 
“would expand legal protections for battered immigrant women so that they 
may flee violent homes, obtain court protections, and cooperate in the 
criminal prosecution of their abusers without fear of deportation.”211 
At the July hearing, another bill sponsor, Representative Sheila Jackson 
Lee (D-Tex.), told stories of undocumented IPV survivors failed by existing 
immigration legislation.212  In her prepared statement, she explained that 
“immigrant women are caught in an intersection of immigration, family and 
welfare laws that do[] not positively reflect on their needs and life 
 
 204. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text. 
 205. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 245–48.  These statements have fallen out of favor 
in recent Supreme Court terms. Id. at 247. 
 206. DWORKIN, supra note 183, at 343 (“It would be absurd, of course, to count every 
statement any legislator makes about the purpose of a statute as itself the act of the state.”); 
see, e.g., Montana Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951, 956 n.8 (9th Cir. 
1981) (“[T]he remarks of but one senator made subsequent to the passage of the bill . . . do 
not provide a reliable indication of the understanding of the Senate as a whole.”). 
 207. See generally infra notes 208–23 and accompanying text. 
 208. 145 CONG. REC. 26,577–78 (1999); About Jan, CONGRESSWOMAN JAN SCHAKOWSKY, 
https://schakowsky.house.gov/about-jan1/ [https://perma.cc/6FTF-NZCT] (last visited Apr. 
13, 2018). 
 209. See 145 CONG. REC. 26,577 (1999). 
 210. See id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 27–30; see, e.g., supra notes 1–4 and 
accompanying text. 
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experiences, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation with few options to 
redress their situations.”213  Likely in an effort to win over her more 
conservative colleagues, Representative Schakowsky testified at the hearing:  
“Let me begin by emphasizing what my bill will NOT do:  It will NOT open 
the floodgates to undocumented or unwanted immigrants.”214 
The bill’s U Visa provisions were watered down in conference.215  
However, its Senate supporters echoed this same intent.  Senator Ted 
Kennedy (D-Mass.), who championed the immigration measures in the 
Senate,216 took a similarly balanced tone.  Senator Kennedy described the 
need for undocumented IPV survivors “to seek protective orders and 
cooperate with law enforcement officials to prosecute crimes of domestic 
violence.”217  Still, he described the bill’s purpose as being to “make it easier 
for these immigrants and their children to escape abusive relationships and 
obtain the help they deserve.”218  Senator Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.), another 
sponsor, explained, “We also, for the first time, look at battered 
immigrants . . . .  They need to understand their rights, that their bodies don’t 
belong to anyone else, and they have a right to cry out if they are abused.”219  
However, other supporters spoke about how the bill would help to facilitate 
much-needed prosecution of abusers.  Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) spoke 
about his time as a prosecutor and explained, “One of the things I learned in 
my years as a prosecutor is that too often nobody wanted to pursue [IPV] 
cases. . . .  This act, itself, will help focus the attention of law enforcement 
on this.”220  And Senator Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.) spoke to the importance 
of the multiple facets of the bill:  “The [domestic violence] hotline is 
important; the training for police is important; the support for law 
enforcement is important; the support for battered women shelters is so 
important . . . .  All of this matters.”221 
The original House sponsors were more measured in their praise of the 
final bill.  Representative Jackson Lee explained that the bill’s intent—to 
protect the uniquely vulnerable undocumented IPV survivors—was 
unchanged, but she lamented what was lost.222  In particular, she lamented 
the exclusion of BIWPA 1999’s proposal to expand existing law to allow 
 
 213. BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 30. 
 214. Id. at 33. 
 215. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. 
 216. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,169 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) 
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 217. Id. at S10,170. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at S10,173. 
 220. Id. at S10,176–77. 
 221. Id. at S10,180. 
 222. Compare 146 CONG. REC. H9034 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2000) (statement of Rep. Jackson 
Lee) (“The Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999, would provide much needed 
access to battered immigrant victims of domestic violence.”), with id. at H9041 (“I am very 
disappointed that some missing provisions that were in [the BIWPA] are not in the Conference 
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undocumented immigrants to access public assistance.223  While neither she 
nor Representative Schakowsky spoke directly about the U Visa provisions, 
Representative Jackson Lee’s lukewarm statements indicate that something 
was lost from the original bill.224 
Ultimately, these statements indicate that the certification requirement 
should not be interpreted without caution.  The initially optional, very broad 
certification requirement was transformed into a mandatory, narrower 
requirement, which disappointed the BIWPA’s sponsors.225  However, the 
bill’s liberal supporters in the Senate were laudatory and enthusiastic, 
indicating that the U Visa was still intended to aid survivors.  In Part IV, this 
Note proposes guidelines in keeping with this balance. 
c.  Debate 
This balance is echoed in the congressional debates between supporters 
and detractors.  Congressional debates between supporters and detractors 
carry limited weight in analysis, partly because legislators interject 
hyperbolic statements to persuade their colleagues.226  Nevertheless, these 
debates can help illuminate the issues.227  Here, the discussions at the July 
hearing are instructive as they show the two battling impulses of the House:  
to protect undocumented IPV survivors on the one hand, and to encourage 
cooperation with law enforcement on the other. 
In his opening statement at the hearing, Representative Lamar S. Smith (R-
Tex.), the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, 
iterated his concerns about the bill.228  He criticized the initial U Visa 
provisions and pointed out that “many of the benefits created in this bill do 
not require battered aliens to cooperate with law enforcement officers to 
enable them to investigate or prosecute the aliens’ abusers.”229  He later 
posed a question to Leslye Orloff, director of the Immigrant Women Program 
at the NOW Legal Defense Fund,230 who testified earlier in the hearing:  “Do 
you not think the bill could be improved if we required cooperation with law 
enforcement officials to go after the abusers?”231  Ms. Orloff advised against 
such a requirement,232 but Representative Smith was unconvinced and stated, 
“I have a major disagreement with the bill if it is not going to require 
 
 223. See id. at H9041 (“I . . . deeply regret that there are no provisions in the report that 
provide access to food stamps to battered aliens; and access to housing, and access to benefits 
that would enable the alien to avoid battery or extreme cruelty in the future.”). 
 224. Cf. supra notes 222–23. 
 225. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text. 
 226. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 187, at 36–37.  Professors Mikva and Lane also 
distinguish between different types of debate and give hearing and committee debate more 
weight than “hot” floor debate. See id. 
 227. See id. 
 228. BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 24. 
 229. Id. at 24. 
 230. Id. at 57. 
 231. Id. at 73. 
 232. See id. at 73–74 (“I don’t think it would be wise to have any piece of legislation that 
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cooperation with law enforcement officials to try to stop the abuse from 
occurring.”233 
This colloquy indicates why the U Visa provisions changed from the 
suggestion in BIWPA 1999 to the requirement in VTVPA—concern that the 
original U Visa would not do enough to protect the public safety.  This 
concern is addressed by allowing U Visa applicants to seek certification from 
an agency that has played some role in helping to “stop the abuse from 
occurring.”  Family courts help to do this in a variety of proceedings.234 
d.  Executive Statements 
Executive statements, usually presidential signing statements or veto 
statements, are given limited weight in statutory interpretation.235  President 
Clinton made three statements on VTVPA:  one on the passage of the bill in 
the House,236 one on the passage of the bill in Congress,237 and a signing 
statement.238  All three statements are laudatory,239 but the only one to 
address the immigration provisions is the signing statement.  In the signing 
statement, President Clinton said, “Of great importance, [VTVPA] restores 
and expands VAWA’s protections for battered immigrants by helping them 
escape abuse and by holding batterers accountable.”240  He went on to 
describe the U Visa provision in the same terms as the congressional debate, 
as a balance between “greater protection to victims” and “strengthening the 
ability of law enforcement agencies to detect, investigate, and prosecute cases 
of domestic violence.”241 
*          *          * 
Ultimately, the Congress that enacted the BIWPA clearly intended to 
compromise between the goals of protecting undocumented IPV survivors 
and punishing abusers.242  As evidenced by the most authoritative sources of 
legislative history, Congress intended to expand immigration relief for 
undocumented IPV survivors to protect otherwise incredibly vulnerable 
people,243 but it was clearly concerned that permissive U Visa requirements 
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would “open the floodgates to unwanted immigrants.”244  Compromise and 
balance are reflected in the bulk of the U Visa’s legislative history.245  Any 
interpretation of the Certification Statute should reflect this compromise. 
IPV survivors frequently seek refuge in family court,246 and Congress, 
which heard from immigration experts and IPV advocates during the 
BIWPA’s hearings,247 knew this.  Through the lens of legislative history, 
family court judges were plausibly authorized by Congress to certify U Visa 
applications, subject to certain limits.  The statements of the bills’ original 
sponsors especially reflect that the Certification Statute was intended to be 
narrower than they initially envisioned and that agencies should not freely 
certify U Visas.  The text provides one such limit—that the certifying agency 
must be the one investigating criminal activity.  This intent plausibly rebuts 
the last antecedent inference and is in keeping with USCIS’s interpretation, 
expressed through the U Visa Regulation.248 
2.  Statutory History of the BIWPA 
One of the oldest rules of statutory interpretation is the mischief rule.249  
This rule was described in Heydon’s Case,250 a 1584 case in the English 
Court of Exchequer.251  The dispute centered around the definition of “estate” 
in an English statute.252  In seeking to resolve this question, Lord Coke 
designed a sequence of questions to determine the statute’s meaning, which 
were targeted to identify the “mischief and defect” in the common law that 
the statute was designed to remedy and then to construct the statutory 
meaning in order to give weight to that remedy.253  This method is still used 
by modern scholars:  Professors Hart and Sacks advised that “[t]he court 
should then proceed to do, in substance, just what Lord Coke said it should 
do in Heydon’s Case.”254  This Part applies this same method to identify the 
“mischief and defect” that the BIWPA was designed to remedy using 
statutory history.  Statutory history is used frequently by courts with minimal 
controversy.255 
Crime became a dominant public issue in the 1960s,256 spurred by a sudden 
and intense rise in violence and increasing anxiety about racial and social 
 
 244. See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
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change in America.257  It became a dominant political issue in 1964 when 
Barry Goldwater, the Republican presidential candidate, campaigned on a 
platform of “enforcing law and order.”258  While Goldwater’s candidacy 
failed dramatically, crime was placed on the national stage and did not leave 
for over two decades.259 
The Republican presidencies of those two decades emphasized the 
punishment of criminals, beginning with President Nixon stoking fears about 
civil rights protesters and anti-Vietnam protestors.260  This continued into the 
1980s, when President Reagan implemented partisan anticrime policy, which 
emphasized harsh sentencing and erosion of the criminal justice reforms 
presided over by the Warren Court in the 1960s.261 
In 1992, Bill Clinton, then a young Democrat from Arkansas, ran a more 
conservative kind of campaign than his Democratic predecessors.  In its 
endorsement of his candidacy, the New York Times wrote: 
Mr. Clinton has taken strong and consistent positions, often notably more 
moderate than those of traditional liberal Democrats.  For instance, he says 
to deadbeat fathers who fail to pay child support:  “Take responsibility for 
your children, or we will force you to do so.”  Note the words responsibility 
and force.262 
President Clinton’s election was described by a critic as emblematic of “an 
elite-led, extralegal, and often violent intolerance for the disorder inherent in 
active citizen agency and a democratic public sphere,”263 while his supporters 
described him as “devot[ed] to social justice.”264 
As President, one of the largest reforms Clinton oversaw was the passage 
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (the “Crime 
Bill”).265  The Crime Bill was a massive anticrime initiative passed after a 
long, nasty legislative battle.266  It increased funding for police, following 
Clinton’s campaign promise to put 100,000 new police officers on the streets; 
increased funding to build new prisons; instituted the “three-strikes rule” and 
an assault weapons ban; and earmarked billions for crime-prevention 
programs.267  One of those spending programs was the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994.268  VAWA 1994 authorized $1.6 billion for programs 
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seeking to end gender-based violence, including intimate partner violence.269  
Recognizing that immigrant IPV survivors are subjected to a particular kind 
of immigration abuse, VAWA 1994 created a pathway for abused noncitizens 
married to citizens or lawful permanent residents to handle their own 
petitions for status.270 
BIWPA 1999 was proposed when Congress was returning to VAWA 1994 
to reauthorize the spending programs, and was eventually included in VAWA 
2000.271  In terms of statutory history, the mischief that VAWA 1994 was 
intended to cure was clearly crime.  The chosen remedy was established by 
decades of legislation that put more police on the streets, enforced longer 
sentences for criminals, and built more prisons to house them.272  Congress 
was driven by “the three ‘P’s’ of police officers, prisons, and prevention.”273  
This purpose would telegraph a clear, narrow reading of the Certification 
Statute:  If police, prosecutors, and sentencing authorities have always been 
the chosen statutory remedies, then criminal courts alone should be allowed 
to certify U Visas. 
However, this conclusion is complicated by the discussions surrounding 
VAWA 2000, which was included in VTVPA.  In the debates on VTVPA, 
legislators spoke of a different “three Ps”:  prevention, protection, and 
prosecution.274  When BIWPA 1999 was introduced, the mischief remained 
high crime, but the chosen remedy was no longer so clear.  While prosecution 
of abusers was still preferred, there was a growing recognition that public 
safety could be achieved through promoting social programs like the National 
Domestic Violence Hotline and funding local shelters and service 
providers.275  This trend continued with the passage of VAWA 2005.  The 
hearings on VAWA 2005 emphasized collaboration between service 
providers and law enforcement to combat IPV.276 
Ultimately, the U Visa was established at a turning point, when Congress 
was no longer so certain that punishment was always the correct remedy to 
the mischief of IPV.  This Note proposes that any interpretation of the 
Certification Statute should reflect the congressional realization that IPV is 
not only combated by criminal courts but also by civil courts and agencies. 
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III.  U VISA CERTIFICATION IN PRACTICE 
This Part surveys the current published practices surrounding family court 
U Visa certification in the United States to inform this Note’s proposed 
guidelines for family court U Visa certification. 
The decision to certify a U Visa application is discretionary and not subject 
to judicial review or judicial mandamus.277  Courts278 and agencies279 all 
differ dramatically in their approaches to certification.  Family courts 
themselves are equally uncertain about their power to certify U Visa 
applications.  Some state judiciaries have issued guidance on whether family 
courts can certify U Visa applications,280 and the AAO has issued one 
nonprecedential decision hinting at its approval of the practice of family court 
certification.281  Part III.A reviews the limited existing jurisprudence on 
family court U Visa certification, Part III.B reviews current state-judiciary 
guidance, and Part III.C describes the sole AAO decision discussing civil 
court certification. 
A.  Family Court Cases Addressing U Visa Certification 
There are only three published opinions that rule on whether family courts 
can certify U Visa applications:  all come from Queens County, New York, 
two are authored by the same family court judge, and none agree—not even 
the opinions written by the same judge. 
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1.  In re Rosales 
A family court judge certified a U Visa application in In re Rosales.282  
The U Visa applicant, Ms. Rosales, had previously petitioned the Queens 
County Family Court for an order of protection against her abusive 
husband.283  The court held an inquest and granted Ms. Rosales a final two-
year “stay away” order of protection.284  The judge that presided over the 
original proceeding had since retired, and a different family court judge 
certified Ms. Rosales’s U Visa application on his review of the transcript of 
the inquest and her family offense petition.285  In its opinion, the court ruled, 
without any analysis, that “[a] State or local Judge qualifies as a certifying 
official under [the U Visa Regulation].”286 
2.  In re Clara F. 
Three years after the decision in In re Rosales, a different family court 
judge in Queens County, Judge John Hunt, declined to certify a U Visa 
application.  In In re Clara F.,287 the applicant, Ms. F., commenced two 
family offense proceedings,288 one visitation proceeding, and one child 
support proceeding in Westchester County Family Court.289  In connection 
with the second family offense proceeding, the Westchester County Family 
Court found that the respondent committed attempted assault in the third 
degree and harassment in the second degree and entered a two-year “stay 
away” order of protection in favor of Ms. F.290  However, for reasons unclear 
to the Queens County Family Court judge, Ms. F.’s request for U Visa 
certification was referred to Queens County.291 
In refusing to honor Ms. F.’s request, the Queens County court observed 
that the family offense proceeding was not a criminal one and that “the 
Family Court had no role in presiding over any prosecution, conviction, or 
sentencing of a defendant.”292  However, the court nevertheless directed Ms. 
F. to make her request to the Westchester judge that adjudicated her family 
offense petition, which implied that its denial was only the “reasoned 
judgment” of the court and that other courts might reasonably rule 
differently.293 
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3.  In re Patricia C. 
Later that year, Judge Hunt again declined a request to certify a U Visa 
application in In re Patricia C.294  Five months prior to the ruling, Ms. C. 
sought an order of protection from the court against her husband.295  Ms. C.’s 
family offense petition described her husband’s verbal, emotional, financial, 
and physical abuse.296  She also explained that she filed a report with her 
local police precinct.297  At the inquest, the court found that her husband 
committed aggravated harassment in the second degree and harassment in the 
Second Degree, and it entered a two-year “stay away” order of protection.298  
Ms. C. then applied to the family court for U Visa certification.299 
In its refusal, the court explained that “[t]he Family Court is not a criminal 
court and it exercises no criminal jurisdiction,” and “[t]he family offense 
proceeding which was commenced by Patricia C. is a civil proceeding.”300  
It further explained that, while a family offense proceeding has criminal 
characteristics, the final adjudication “does not constitute a criminal 
conviction.”301  The court also declined to certify Ms. C.’s U Visa application 
on the basis of her involvement with the police and suggested that Ms. C. 
instead bring her request directly to the police department.302 
Judge Hunt’s two opinions clearly conflict:  his opinion in In re Clara F. 
suggests that family courts can certify U Visa applications, while his opinion 
in In re Patricia C. states that family courts are never authorized to certify U 
Visa applications.  However, the commonalities in the two opinions are 
instructive.  Both make clear that the applicant has another recourse, which 
implies that he might have ruled differently had there been no involvement 
with another court or the police.303  And both opinions make clear that a 
family offense proceeding is not a criminal proceeding.304 
B.  State Approaches to U Visa Certification 
State judiciaries have also taken a stance on the issue of family court 
U Visa certification.  Representative groups of the New York and Minnesota 
judiciaries have argued that family court judges may issue U Visa 
certifications.  On February 14, 2017, the Advisory Council on Immigration 
Issues in Family Court circulated an advisory memorandum among the New 
York family courts, which offered guidance on the role of the family courts 
in U Visa petitions.305  The Council’s memorandum took a much more liberal 
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approach than that expounded in In re Clara F. and In re Patricia C.  It 
explains that it is well within the role of family court judges to certify U Visa 
applications in a wide range of cases.306  Two years earlier, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court had issued an advisory opinion allowing for the possibility 
that a state court judge “presiding over a civil case such as an Order for 
Protection or dissolution [of marriage] proceeding” may certify a U Visa 
application, but only if the applicant is likely to be helpful in a later criminal 
trial.307 
C.  Administrative Appeals Office Decision 
The appeals office within DHS has also considered family court U Visa 
certification.  USCIS’s initial decision on a U Visa petition is reviewable de 
novo by the AAO.308  AAO decisions are primarily nonprecedential, meaning 
they “do not create or modify USCIS policy or practice” and “do not provide 
a basis for applying new or alternative interpretations of law or policy.”309  
The AAO has issued no precedential decisions on U Visa certification, but in 
one of its nonprecedential decisions, the AAO ruled that USCIS must grant 
U Visas based solely on a family court proceeding, even where the IPV 
survivor refused to pursue criminal prosecution.310 
In that case, a U Visa applicant sought an order of protection in family 
court, spoke with the police, and refused to pursue criminal charges.311  She 
submitted a certification executed by the presiding Illinois judge.312  The 
certification detailed the petitioner’s cooperation in a civil-order-of-
protection proceeding.313  USCIS initially denied her U Visa application 
because “obtaining a protection order, in itself, does not qualify as reporting 
criminal activity.”314  The AAO reversed and held that this statement 
“misstates the applicable standard.”315  The AAO also found that the 
petitioner’s refusal to sign a criminal complaint, in light of the available 
evidence (her testimony that she was financially dependent on her husband), 
was not unreasonable and that this also misstated the applicable standard.316 
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There is clearly no consensus on whether family courts can certify U Visa 
applications.  The jurisprudence is unsettled, and the AAO has issued no final 
determination.  Undocumented IPV survivors, already vulnerable in so many 
ways, need a settled legal standard. 
IV.  A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK:  A FAMILY COURT MUST BE ABLE TO 
CERTIFY THAT THE IPV SURVIVOR WAS HELPFUL 
IN A PROCEEDING THAT HINGED ON A FINDING OF IPV 
Part II of this Note explained that family courts are authorized to certify 
U Visa applications.317  A textual analysis of the BIWPA shows there is a 
limit to this authority; while on its face the statute empowers any state judge 
to certify a U Visa application,318 its surrounding text somewhat narrows the 
definition by requiring some kind of involvement with investigating IPV,319 
protecting IPV survivors,320 or facilitating the reporting of IPV.321  The 
legislative history of the BIWPA shows that the Certification Statute was a 
compromise between two forces in Congress:  one interested in protecting 
undocumented IPV survivors and the other interested in facilitating the 
cooperation of undocumented survivors with police and prosecutors.322  The 
statutory history of the BIWPA, compared with the Violence Against Women 
Act, shows a shift, albeit an incomplete one, from a punitive approach to 
crime to a collaborative approach to intimate partner violence.323  This Part 
proposes guidelines for family court U Visa certification within these 
bounds. 
No court or agency has yet established a framework that is supported by 
the Certification Statute.  The Queens County Family Court—the only court 
to have published decisions on the subject—offers three different options:  a 
family court may unequivocally certify on the basis of observed criminal 
activity,324 a family court must be presiding over the fact-finding stage of a 
proceeding in order to certify an application,325 or a family court may 
unequivocally not certify.326  The judicial opinions on whether a federal court 
presiding over a civil proceeding can certify a U Visa application offer 
another array of options for certification.327  In response to this vacuum, this 
Part proposes a framework for family court U Visa certification that is 
supported by the Certification Statute. 
This Note proposes that to certify a U Visa application, a family court must 
be able to certify that the IPV survivor was helpful in a family court 
proceeding that hinged on a finding of intimate partner violence. 
 
 317. See supra Part II. 
 318. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 320. See supra notes 122–36, 201–04 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 322. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 323. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 324. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 325. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 326. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 327. See supra note 278. 
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By a textual analysis alone, family courts are authorized to certify U Visa 
applications whether or not they are adjudicating a proceeding hinging on 
IPV.328  Reading its text in a vacuum, the Certification Statute only requires 
helpfulness to an investigation of criminal activity, regardless of who 
conducts it.329  However, the role of the judiciary is to act as a faithful agent 
of the legislature, not to interpret in a vacuum.330  Part II analyzed the purpose 
of the legislature in enacting the BIWPA by looking to its legislative and 
statutory histories.  The legislative history indicates that Congress intended 
to limit the ability of the government to grant U Visas while still protecting 
IPV survivors.331  The statutory history indicates that the BIWPA came at a 
turning point in Congress’s approach to violent crime.332  And because the 
statute was written at this turning point, this Part proposes a guideline that 
both balances the desire to facilitate the punishment of criminals with the 
desire to stop crime and empowers IPV survivors to protect themselves.333  
This proposed guideline is supported by textual interpretation that allows 
family courts to certify U Visa applications, legislative history that requires 
limits on that certification, and statutory history that allows those limits to be 
relaxed. 
Part III.A offers a framework for what constitutes intimate partner 
violence, Part III.B offers a framework for what constitutes helpfulness, and 
Part III.C offers a survey of which types of proceedings hinge on a finding of 
intimate partner violence. 
A.  What Constitutes Intimate Partner Violence 
This Note proposes that family court judges are only authorized to certify 
U Visa applications where the intimate partner violence is in violation of 
criminal statutes.  Intimate partner violence encompasses a great deal of 
behavior that is not codified as criminal.  For example, abusers sometimes 
publish intimate photos of their partners to humiliate them or exert control 
over their lives, a practice called “revenge porn” or “nonconsensual 
pornography.”334  Nonconsensual pornography is not illegal in every state,335 
but it is clearly IPV.336 
This Part proposes that family court judges should, in order to fulfill the 
balance required by the Certification Statute, only certify U Visa applications 
 
 328. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text. 
 330. See Kaye, supra note 182, at 604. 
 331. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 332. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 333. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 334. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014); Frequently Asked Questions, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, 
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/G6RX-FXS9] (last visited Apr. 13, 
2018). 
 335. See 38 States + DC Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, 
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/4C9S-4HXW] (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 336. See Citron & Franks, supra note 334, at 351. 
2018] U VISAS AND FAMILY COURTS 2961 
when there is a violation of existing criminal law.  Since the decision to 
certify a U Visa is committed solely to the discretion of the certifying 
authority,337 how a family court judge determines a violation of existing 
criminal law should be left to her discretion. 
B.  What Constitutes Helpfulness 
This Part offers examples of what actions survivors can take to meet the 
helpfulness requirement of the Certification Statute, including filing initial 
family court pleadings, testifying in family court, and entering into settlement 
agreements with their abuser. 
First, filing initial pleadings is helpful.  An investigation is a broad and 
systematic inquiry.338  IPV survivors who petition the court for relief from 
IPV are initiating that systematic inquiry.  A family court may certify a 
U Visa application at this early pleading stage.  Not only has the IPV survivor 
already been helpful but the filing indicates a willingness on the part of the 
survivor to be helpful in the future at the fact-finding stages.  Even if the 
petition is withdrawn, as is often the situation in IPV cases,339 the survivor 
has indicated a willingness to be helpful. 
Second, testifying in family court is helpful.  It takes tremendous bravery 
for IPV survivors to testify in open court about their abuse.  By testifying 
about their abuse, survivors are helping family courts in the fact-finding 
process.  In fact, most family court proceedings call for testimony to aid in 
making a final determination.340  IPV survivors who testify about their abuse 
at any point meet the helpfulness element. 
Finally, entering into a settlement agreement is helpful.  IPV survivors who 
testify or file a pleading demonstrate helpfulness with family court 
investigation even if they reach a settlement.  Settlement indicates, at 
minimum, a willingness to be helpful in the investigation of criminal activity 
in two ways.  First, a survivor who settles with her abuser has still likely 
detailed the IPV she suffered in her initial pleadings.  Second, entering into 
a settlement agreement plausibly indicates a willingness to enforce that 
agreement.  It is a crime to violate orders of protection (even those entered 
on consent),341 custody agreements,342 and child support agreements.343  A 
survivor who enters into one of these agreements thus has indicated a 
willingness to pursue these criminal penalties in the event of violation. 
 
 337. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
 338. See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text. 
 339. See, e.g., Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for 
Battered Women:  An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 1068–
70 (1993). 
 340. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 832, 835 (McKinney 2018) (requiring a fact-finding 
hearing before entering a final order of protection). 
 341. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6 (2018) (providing that violating a protective order 
is a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment). 
 342. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.03 (West 2017) (providing that violating a 
custody order is a felony). 
 343. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 260.05–.06 (McKinney 2018) (providing that refusal to 
pay child support is a class A misdemeanor or class E felony). 
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C.  Which Proceedings Hinge on a Finding 
of Intimate Partner Violence 
This Part outlines certain proceedings where a family court is investigating 
criminal activity and is therefore authorized to certify a litigant’s U Visa 
application.  Family law is a matter of state law.344  Therefore, which types 
of proceedings hinge on a finding of IPV vary from state to state.  This Part 
analyzes a few different types of proceedings that would qualify under this 
framework based on the laws of three of the states with the highest numbers 
of undocumented people:  California, Texas, and New York.345 
Every state has some version of a civil order of protection that is intended 
to aid survivors of intimate partner violence.346  Statutory requirements vary, 
but family court judges typically must make a factual or legal determination 
that IPV occurred or is imminent.347  For example, in California, a family 
court must find that there is “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse” 
before entering a protective order.348  Family courts adjudicating an order of 
protection are always empowered to certify a U Visa of the petitioner because 
these proceedings always hinge on a finding of intimate partner violence. 
A family court judge is also authorized to certify U Visa applications in 
certain state divorce proceedings.  Every state has some version of no-fault 
divorce.349  However, most state no-fault divorce laws require a finding of 
something like “‘irreconcilable differences’ or ‘irretrievable breakdown of 
the marriage’” before granting a divorce.350  If intimate partner violence is 
argued as a basis for that irretrievable breakdown, this Part proposes that the 
presiding family court judge is authorized to certify a U Visa application.  
Some states enacted no-fault divorce law to supplement the fault schemes.351  
For example, in Texas, cruelty is a ground for divorce.352  Cruelty is 
established by “[a]ny conduct of one spouse sufficient to raise a reasonable 
fear of bodily harm in the other,”353 including physical and verbal abuse,354 
threats,355 and sexual abuse.356  Ultimately, a family court adjudicating a 
 
 344. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 345. See U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Population Estimates, PEW RES. CTR., 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/interactives/unauthorized-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/5PAT-
E5BV] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 346. See Nawal H. Ammar et al., Battered Immigrant Women in the United States and 
Protection Orders:  An Exploratory Research, 37 CRIM. JUST. REV. 337, 338 (2012). 
 347. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 339, at 1043–48. 
 348. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6300 (2017). 
 349. FAMILY LAW & PRACTICE § 4.02 (Arnold H. Rutkin ed., 2017). 
 350. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism:  The Guided-Choice Regime of 
Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1922 (2012); see, e.g., TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.001 (West 2017) (“[T]he court may grant a divorce without regard to 
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 351. See, e.g., 48 N.Y. JUR. 2D Domestic Relations § 2270 (2017). 
 352. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.002. 
 353. 39 TEX. JUR. 3D Family Law § 353 (2017). 
 354. See id. 
 355. Id. § 355. 
 356. See id. § 357. 
2018] U VISAS AND FAMILY COURTS 2963 
divorce where the divorce could only be granted on a finding of IPV, as in 
the no-fault or fault-based schemes described above, is authorized to certify 
a U Visa application. 
Some states require that courts consider IPV in custody and visitation 
determinations.357  Where an IPV survivor is helpful in a custody and 
visitation proceeding in which IPV is alleged and investigated—where, for 
example, she describes IPV in her custody petition or testifies to IPV in the 
adjudication—the family court is authorized to certify her U Visa 
application. 
Family court determinations of spousal and child support can also hinge 
on IPV.358  However, this is rare.  In New York, only “egregious conduct” is 
relevant in fixing a domestic support obligation359—for example, in Stevens 
v. Stevens,360 an intermediate appellate court in New York affirmed a 
downward modification of spousal support where the recipient was 
physically abusive, verbally abusive, and unfaithful in the marriage.361  
Family courts adjudicating domestic support proceedings should, thus, only 
certify U Visa applications in the rare case where IPV is a factor considered 
by the court. 
Family court determinations of paternity can also, in rare cases, consider 
IPV.  California law recognizes multiple types of legal fathers.362  Biology is 
not the determinative factor, and courts may consider domestic violence in 
granting paternal rights.363  However, in New York, paternity is established 
solely by biology, which can be proven by DNA testing or by evidence of a 
sexual relationship between the parents around the time of conception.364  In 
a state like New York, a family court should not certify a U Visa application 
for a parent who testifies about intimate partner violence during a paternity 
proceeding because it has no weight in judicial analysis.  However, a court 
may certify a U Visa application for the parent that testifies about IPV during 
a California-style paternity proceeding, where the proceeding may hinge on 
that testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
Undocumented IPV survivors are in an incredibly vulnerable position.  
Survivors are often in immediate physical danger from their abusers who use 
the survivors’ immigration status as a weapon.  And there are often many 
obstacles barring undocumented survivors from seeking assistance.  
 
 357. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004 (West 
2017). 
 358. See, e.g., In re Denton, No. G044821, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2328, at *26–
28 (Mar. 27, 2012). 
 359. 48 N.Y. JUR. 2D Domestic Relations § 2577 (2017). 
 360. 484 N.Y.S.2d 708 (App. Div. 1985). 
 361. See id. at 710. 
 362. In re P.A., 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 556, 561 (Ct. App. 2011) (“There are three types of 
fathers in juvenile dependency law:  presumed, biological, and alleged.”). 
 363. See id. at 561–65 (declining to automatically grant parental rights to a child’s 
biological father despite genetic testing results). 
 364. See 46 N.Y. JUR. 2D Domestic Relations § 903 (2017). 
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Obtaining temporary legal status allows survivors to access that assistance.  
The BIWPA was intended to facilitate this access. 
Although the law enforcement certification requirement restricts who can 
access the U Visa, statutory interpretation shows that this requirement was 
not intended to bar immigration relief to survivors who choose to protect 
themselves and their families by going to family court instead of approaching 
a prosecutor.  Legal authorities should recognize that family courts may 
certify U Visa applications where the IPV survivor was, is, or is likely to be 
helpful in a proceeding hinging on a finding of intimate partner violence.  
This Note recommends guidelines for U Visa certification in the hopes that 
IPV advocates will be able to obtain certification for as many clients as 
possible, that family courts will confidently certify the U Visa applications 
of its litigants, and that as many undocumented survivors as possible will be 
able to overcome one more unnecessary obstacle to safety and obtain legal 
status. 
